Ronald S Laura, Michael Leahy; Religious Upbringing and Rational Autonomy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 253–265, h.

Ronald S Laura, Michael Leahy; Religious Upbringing and Rational Autonomy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 253–265, h.

In a recent essay, Tasos Kazepides has used the later Wittgenstein’s account of religious beliefs as either ‘superstitions’ or non-rational to condemn such beliefs as ‘doctrines’. By this term he means teachings which close minds to alternative truth-claims. In this paper we criticise his interpretation and use of Wittgenstein and argue that, far from closing minds, an appropriate education in religious beliefs can open minds to possible realms of existence unconsidered in other subjects of the curriculum.

This well-documented collection challenges the reader to examine and judge the arguments in six areas of contemporary unrest: women's liberation, black liberation, gay liberation, children's liberation, animal liberation and liberation in the Third World. It refrains from taking a single point of view, thus allowing the reader to gain an insight into the various aspects of the debate. Designed both for students and a general audience, The Liberation Debate encourages readers to become active participants in fraught and topical debates.

This well-documented collection challenges the reader to examine and judge the arguments in six areas of contemporary unrest: women's liberation, black liberation, gay liberation, children's liberation, animal liberation and liberation in the Third World. It refrains from taking a single point of view, thus allowing the reader to gain an insight into the various aspects of the debate. Designed both for students and a general audience, _The Liberation Debate_ encourages readers to become active participants in fraught and topical debates.

In a recent essay, Tasos Kazepides has used the later Wittgenstein’s account of religious beliefs as either ‘superstitions’ or non-rational to condemn such beliefs as ‘doctrines’. By this term he means teachings which close minds to alternative truth-claims. In this paper we criticise his interpretation and use of Wittgenstein and argue that, far from closing minds, an appropriate education in religious beliefs can open minds to possible realms of existence unconsidered in other subjects of the curriculum.

In a recent essay, Tasos Kazepides has used the later Wittgenstein’s account of religious beliefs as either ‘superstitions’ or non-rational to condemn such beliefs as ‘doctrines’. By this term he means teachings which close minds to alternative truth-claims. In this paper we criticise his interpretation and use of Wittgenstein and argue that, far from closing minds, an appropriate education in religious beliefs can open minds to possible realms of existence unconsidered in other subjects of the curriculum.